Islamism's failure, Islamists' future Olivier Roy - openDemocracy
オリヴィエ・ロワ。経歴は以下。
Olivier Roy is a professor at the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences in Paris (Ehess) and the author of The Failure of Political Islam (Harvard University Press, 1994), The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York University Press, 2000), Globalized Islam (Columbia University Press, 2004), and (with Mariam Abou Zahab) Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (Columbia University Press, 2004).
For they have (almost) abandoned the idea that the Islamic state is a way to change global society. But what has replaced it? Here there is a wide array of positions along a spectrum that runs from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey's prime minister, to the Taliban in Afghanistan.For me, the main shift has been towards what I call Islamo-nationalism. Most of the Islamist parties and movements have in the last decade and a half recasted their direction in nationalist terms - even if they didn't give up the idea that sharia should be the basis of the state.
such activists are (almost by definition) now entering the political scene through processes of democratisation. True, there is room for debate about how practical and real the change among Islamist parties and movements has been. In Turkey, for example, many secularists (including many people in the army) consider that Erdoğan didn't truly abandon the idea of building an Islamic state in Turkey, that he retains a "hidden agenda".But the Turkish example makes the point that "sincerity" is not the issue - for it is not a political concept. It is democratisation itself that matters: the fact that these movements are entering the political scene through making alliances with others, pledging to accept election results, and seeking to go beyond their constituency.
Moreover, the current agenda of most of the movements - Hamas, the Iranian revolution (including that of current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), the AK party in Turkey, the FIS, an-Nahda, the Reform Party in Yemen, and even to some extent the Jamaat-e-Islami - is far more nationalist than Islamist. Most of the Muslim Brotherhood's chapters (local movements) are also recasting their political action in national (if not necessarily nationalistic) terms.
Third, democratisation has further consequences. President George W Bush launched his military intervention in Iraq in the name of democratisation of the middle east. The problem with this approach is threefold: that secular democracies cannot possibly be created in the middle east within a few years, that any true democratisation will lead to Islamists becoming part of government, and that there is no democratisation without political legitimacy.Political legitimacy in the wider region means, at least for the moment, two things: nationalism and religion. You cannot win by going against nationalistic and religious feelings. This is true in Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan - everywhere. The idea that democratisation will undermine nationalism in the middle east never made sense. Any nationalist movement today will protest against western encroachment and United States intervention.
Islamists have not given up all of their religious ideology. One thing remains: sharia, with family law at its core. This is an issue of identity. From Morocco to Pakistan, including Iran, the key debate is about family law and, by definition, the status of women.Some of its leading figures may, like Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, accept democracy; others, such as the Muslim cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, agree that it is the least-bad system, not to be opposed, but insist on sharia. Family law is not negotiable for figures such as al-Qaradawi; penal measures or legal punishments may be, but not this.
実際問題として、イラクではすでにイスラム主義者と交渉していることに注意。イラク・イスラム革命最高評議会（SCIRI）もアッダワ党もヒズボラの流れを汲むイスラム政党。
I consider that most Islamists are ready for engagement. They have changed and are changing because their societies have changed and are changing. Turkey is not the same society as twenty years ago. No reversal, no going back, is possible. This means engaging Hamas and Hizbollah too. The problem is that we are doing exactly the contrary now. We say we will never negotiate with so-called "terrorists". But if we don't negotiate, we should either withdraw or go for war. You cannot say, "I will not negotiate, I will just stay here." No. Something will happen; something is happening.The present policies create this choice of war or withdrawal. Instead, we should go back to diplomacy and Realpolitik and give up any ideology-led perception of what is going on in the middle east.
